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ANASTASOFF, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, AND
FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE
CARL TOBIAS*

In Anastasoff v. United States,1 a three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
invalidated the court's local rule of appellate procedure
providing that "unpublished opinions are not precedent and
parties generally should not cite them." 2 Eighth Circuit Judge
Richard S. Arnold authored the opinion, holding that this local
requirement violates Article ill of the United States
Constitution. Regardless of whether the provocative decision in
Anastasoff is constitutionally sound, the opinion trenchantly
emphasizes the critical significance of a public policy issue that
has remained essentially untreated for too long.
Judge Arnold's Anastasoff opinion perceptively identifies the
substantial complications created by burgeoning caseloads and
the static resources available to resolve these appeals. It
cogently admonishes that the federal judicial system is in
serious difficulty if the volume of appellate filings and
temporal restraints preclude the circuit bench from attributing
precedential value to each case. Judge Arnold concomitantly
rejects the proposition that deficient resources prevent judges
from according all appeals precedential effect. He also
repudiates the notion that appellate courts are currently
developing an underground corpus of law that applies only to
the litigants in a particular case. Instead, he argues that there
must be sufficient resources to address mounting caseloads
adequately, and if these funds are unavailable, every judge ·
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon, Bruce Markell, and Peggy
Sanner for valuable suggestions; Angeline Garbett and Mike Gillooly for
processing the piece; and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support.
1. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en bane, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000).
2 81H CIR. R. 28A(i). A more recent Ninth Circuit opinion upholds that court's
similar rule, see 91H CIR. R. 36-3, and rejects Anastasoff. See Hart v. Massanari, 266
F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
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must devote the requisite time to treat each of the filings
competently, even if backlogs increase.
The three-judge panel, thus, threw down the constitutional
gauntlet by invalidating the Eighth Circuit local rule while
most other appellate courts continue to enforce analogous
provisions. Evaluating the threat to the delivery of appellate
justice posed by these local requirements as discussed in the
Anastasoff opinion, however, is more important. This Comment
also seeks to explore the most promising solutions to that
pressing legal and public policy problem.
Part I of this Comment, therefore, traces the problem of a
historical growth in caseloads without a corresponding rise in
resources as addressed by the Eighth Circuit decision. Part II
evaluates the Anastasoffholding and its implications. Increasing
appeals, scarce resources, and the restrictions imposed by
procedures like the Eighth Circuit local rule may well
jeopardize modern appellate justice, as Judge Arnold's opinion
eloquently
demonstrates.
Part
Ill
then
presents
recommendations for addressing this situation. It analyzes
remedies that might solve or at least ameliorate these problems
at the appellate level, principally through reductions in the
volume of cases that attorneys and parties consider filing and,
should this possibility prove deficient, measures that would
respond directly to those appeals actually pursued in a prompt,
inexpensive, and fair manner.
I.

How CASELOAD GROWTH AND SCARCE REsOURCES
ERODED DELIVERY OF APPELLATE JUSTICE

The problem of expanding appellate caseloads, scarce
resources, and increased reliance on unpublished opinions has
received thorough examination by legal scholars.3 The quantity
of appeals from federal district court decisions has increased

3. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14-51, 106-50 (1994); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: FINAL REPORT 13-28 (1998)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 54
VAND. L. REV. 71, 75-79 (2001); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274-97 (1996); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal
Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 192-96 (1997).
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steadily since the 1970s.4 Congress has partially addressed this
expansion by committing more resources to the federal
appellate judiciary, but its effort has been insufficient and may
have even imposed various disadvantages. For instance,
lawmakers have authorized additional active appellate court
judgeships, but the number of new judicial positions has
apparently failed to keep pace with exponential docket growth
and might have actually contributed to the erosion of judicial
collegiality and consistent decisionmaking. Congress has
simultaneously enlarged the courts' administrative staff and
their responsibilities, although this expansion may have
aggravated the bureaucratic nature of the appellate justice
system.5
The responses to caseload growth with scarce resources have
also varied among the regional circuits.6 Practically all
appellate courts have limited the procedures they accord
appeals, especially by screening them in terms of their
perceived significance and difficulty. For example, courts have
granted oral arguments in a declining percentage of appeals,
and the parties that do secure them frequently have less time to
argue.7 The appellate courts have also promulgated local rules
governing opinion publication and citation identical or
analogous to the Eighth Circuit provision invalidated by the
Anastasoff panel. These prescriptions typically authorize threejudge panels or their individual members to designate certain
decisions as unpublished, thus limiting their precedential
effect.8
4. See, e.g., JUDITii A. McKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTiiER ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 17-35 (1993); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 13-17; Carol Krafka, Civil Caseload Trends in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in
COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 127, 127-144 (1998) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS].
5. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-25, 30-37; Michael
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1603-04 (2000); Richman
& Reynolds, supra note 3, at 286-97; infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., McKENNA, supra note 4, at 41-43; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 21-27; Krafka, supra note 4, at 132-33; see also Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate
System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275, 278 (1999).
7. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34; 5TH CIR. R. 34; 11TH CIR. R. 34. See generally BAKER,
supra note 3, at 108-17; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22, Table 2-6;
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 103-06 (1998); Richman & Reynolds, supra note
3, at 279-81.
8. See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 36; 9TH CIR. R. 36; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 119-35;
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22, Table 2-7; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4,
at 110-13; Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAc. &
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Escalating appellate court caseloads, the static resources
available for treating them, and the circuit bench's responses to
those considerations have had detrimental consequences for
lawyers, litigants, judges, and appellate justice. Most
important, the judiciary' s curtailment of procedural
opportunities has significantly limited the expeditious,
economical, or equitable disposition of appeals. Only in a
dwindling percentage of cases is there comprehensive
resolution on the merits after full briefing and oral argument
before a panel of three circuit judges,9 thereby restricting the
visibility and accountability of the appellate bench.10 This
phenomenon decreases the ability of litigants to present their
views thoroughly before the bench and to clarify matters that
their briefs might not address. Reduced publication limits
judges' responsibilities to justify their substantive
determination and may erode public confidence in appellate
decisionmaking.
II. ANALYSIS OF TiiE ANASTASOFF OPINION

In Anastasoff, the appellant asserted "precisely the same legal
argument" that the Eighth Circuit had rejected eight years
earlier in Christie v. United States.11 The appellant contended,
however, that the earlier ruling did not bind the three-judge
panel because Christie was unpublished and, therefore, not a
precedent under Eighth Circuit local appellate rule 28A(i),
providing that "unpublished opinions are not precedent and
PROC. 219 (1999); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO
ST. L. J. 177 (1999); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 3, at 75-79.
9. See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 42-49. For analyses of appellate justice,
see BAKER, supra note 3, at 14-30; MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 9-11.
10. According to Judge Posner:
[D]enying oral argument when there are lawyers on both sides [of a case]
... tend[s] to diminish the quality of the judicial consideration.... [You
cannot] ask the lawyers questions and you [lack] a period of focused
concentration on that case. (W]hen an opinion is published under the
name of a judge, it enforces a certain responsibility of consideration on
the judge. The worst type of disposition ... just says, affirmed.... [T]hen
the danger of an error of having overlooked something because you did
not reason it out on paper is significant.
Considering Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of
Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts 10-11 Oune
28, 1998) (statement of Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner). See generally
BAKER, supra note 3, at 108-21.
11. No. 91-2375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam).
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parties generally should not cite them." 12 Yet the Anastasoff
panel rejected this argument, holding that "the portion of Rule
28A(i) that strips the precedential weight of unpublished
opinions is unconstitutional under Article ill, as it purports to
confer on the federal courts a power that extends beyond the
'judicial.'"13
In the second part of the decision, Judge Arnold supported
the panel's substantive holding with a comprehensive
historical exegesis on the doctrine of precedent. The jurist
proclaimed that the concept was "well established" by the time
of the Constitutional Convention. He also demonstrated that in
the eighteenth century the judge's obligation to honor
precedent emanated from the fundamental character of the
judicial power, and that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
as well as the Anti-Federalists "assumed that federal judicial
decisions would become authorities in subsequent cases."14
In short, the doctrine of precedent was "well-established in
legal practice, regarded as an immemorial custom," and
"valued for its role in past struggles for liberty."15 The duty of
federal courts to follow previous opinions, meanwhile, "was
understood to derive from the nature of the judicial power
itself and the need to prevent it from creating a dangerous
union with legislative authority." 16 Judge Arnold, thus,
concluded "that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine of
precedent limits the 'judicial power' delegated to the courts in

12. 81H CIR. R. 28A(i).
13. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot
on reh 'gen bane, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1159-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the Ninth Circuit's similar Rule 36-3 and
describing the reasons for its constitutionality). For an earlier rendition of several
ideas that Judge Arnold subsequently included in the Anastasofl opinion, see
Arnold, supra note 8, at 226.
14. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-03 (citations omitted). But see Hart, at 1162-69;
Recent Case, Anastasoff v. United States, 114 HARV. L. REv. 940, 943 (2001). For
analyses of the founders' views of precedent, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 647, 662-66 (1999); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81 (2000).
15. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
16. Id. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-69 (disputing "that the Framers viewed
ecedent in the rigid form that we view it todaV''); Lee, supra note 14, at 660 n.64
During the latter half of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries we
d cases constantly followed in practice but a tendency to assert that they were
not binding in theory."). See generally Arnold, supra note 8, at 226 (considering the
constitutioiiality of forbidding citation to unpublished opinions).

~
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Article III." 17
In this section of his decision, Judge Arnold also explained
what the case did not involve. The question Anastasojfpresented
was not whether appellate courts should publish opinions,
"but whether [unpublished opinions] ought to have
precedential effect."18 He carefully
observed
that
'"unpublished' in this context has never meant 'secret"' and
that all of the opinions and orders rendered by every federal
appellate court in the United States are available to members of
the public.19
Judge Arnold then considered a more practical point.
"Members of the federal appellate bench," he wrote, frequently
observe that the "volume of appeals is so high that it is simply
unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision." 20 In
essence, he intimated that judges lack sufficient "time to do a
decent enough job . . . to justify treating every opinion as a
precedent." 21 The panel remarked that, "[i]f this is true, the
judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is
not to create an underground body of law good for one place
and time only." 22 The court then contended that the
appropriate approach is to "create enough judgeships to
handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to
take enough time to do a competent job with each case. If this
means that backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid." 23
Judge Arnold further explained that local appellate strictures
like Rule 28A(i) "assert that [appeals] courts have the power"
to choose which opinions to follow and a number of local
provisos even proscribe citation to unpublished decisions. Yet,
wrote Arnold, this perspective "exceeds the judicial power,

17. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160-69; Recent Case,
supra note 14, at 943-44. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIFS ON TIIE
CONSTITUTION OF TIIE UNITED STATF.S §§ 377-78 (1833).
18. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 904. "Indeed, most appellate courts now make their
opinions, whether labeled 'published' or not, available to anyone online." Id.
19. Id. See generally Arnold, supra note 8, at 219-20 (describing the origins of
unpublished opinions and the difference between unpublished and published
opinions).
20. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
21. Id. See also supra notes 3-6, 8 and accompanying text.
22 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
23. Id. Accord Richman & Reynolds, supra note 3; see also supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text.
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which is based on reason, notfiat."24
For purposes of clarification, the three-judge panel
emphasized that the court was not "creating some rigid
doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents," expressly
acknowledged that opinions could and sometimes should be
overruled, and stated that "this function can be performed by
the en bane Court, but not by a single panel."25 Judge Arnold
observed that the appeals court has the authority to change
precedents "[i]f the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or
if other exigent circumstances justify it," although the appe:µate
judiciary has the responsibility to substantiate this modification
by explicitly recognizing the precedent from which the appeals
court is departing and by clearly and convincingly articulating
the reasons why it has chosen to disavow the earlier
precedent.26 "In this way, the law grows and changes, but it
does so incrementally, in response to the dictates of reason, and
not because judges have simply changed their minds." 27
The fourth section of Judge Arnold's opinion summarizes the
panel's decision. Judge Arnold reiterates that "[f]ederal courts,
in adopting rules, are not free to extend the judicial power of
the United States described in Article ill ... [which power] is
limited by the doctrine of precedent."28 Anastasoff argues that
local strictures such as Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) permit
"courts to ignore this limit" and to depart from the law in
"prior decisions without any reason to differentiate the cases,"
an exercise of discretion the panel found to contravene directly
the traditional understanding of precedent.29 This local Eighth
Circuit requirement, thus, enlarged the judicial power beyond
its Article ill authority by empowering the appellate bench to
decide what opinions would bind it and, insofar as Rule 28A(i)
purported to circumscribe the precedential effect of earlier
decisions, the provision was unconstitutional.
In the panel's thorough enunciation of the historical and
legal rationales for finding local appeals court provisos like
24. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159-74.
25. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170-74, generally agrees with
the views expressed in this Paragraph.
26. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d. at 904-05.
27. Id. at 905.
28. Id. (citation omitted).
29. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1163-74 (presenting a
different view of the traditional role of precedent).
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Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) unconstitutional, the Anastasojf
opinion raises complex and arcane issues of constitutional
history, theory, and law. The ruling involves complicated
questions about the meaning of the judicial power in Article m
and precedent in the federal system. Regardless of how the
federal judiciary and constitutional scholars ultimately resolve
these issues, the public policy concern about how appellate
courts can best address increasing cases with static resources
will have salience. Definitively resolving the constitutionality
of provisions like Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i)30 is not necessary
to a consideration of the important practical concerns. Even if
the three-judge panel deciding Anastasoff erroneously deemed
the local Eighth Circuit requirement unconstitutional, the
problem created by mounting dockets and limited resources
remains, and it can only become more acute in the future.
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Appellate courts have confronted escalating appeals with
scarce resources. They have responded to caseload growth by
generally restricting procedural opportunities and by
specifically promulgating local publication rules identical or
similar to the Eighth Circuit provisos invalidated in Anastasojf
and upheld in Hart. The growth in the number of appeals is
unlikely to abate, while the available resources will probably
not expand. Given this predicament, the appellate courts can,
thus, invoke two principal courses of action for addressing
docket increases. First, lawmakers might institute approaches
limiting the quantity of appeals parties could pursue and, if
this proved inadequate, they could authorize appellate courts
to employ measures that directly treat the rising cases in a
prompt, inexpensive, and fair fashion causing minimal
interference with appeals court operations.

30. For discussions of these constitutional issues, several of which criticize the
views in Anastasoff, see Hart, 366 F.3d at 1163-74; Lee, supra note 14; Price, supra
note 14; Recent Case, supra note 14; see also Merritt & Brudney, supra note 3, at
118-21 (reporting certain empirical results that support the Anastasoff ruling). See
also Daniel B. Levin, Note, Fairness and Precedent: Anastasoff v. United States, 110
YALE L. J. 1295, 1300 (2001) (criticizing the Anastasoff rule because it would
disadvantage resource-poor litigants).
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A. Limiting the Number ofAppeals

The classic way to reduce the volume of appellate filings
would be to curtail the extensive civil and criminal jurisdiction
of federal district courts. Two commissioners of the fivemember Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals, which recently completed a comprehensive
appellate court study, addressed the civil side of this approach
by urging lawmakers to restrict diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction.31 Nonetheless, certain observers of the federal
judicial and legislative branches doubt that the legislature will
circumscribe jurisdiction generally or diversity specifically.32
Over the last decade, Congress apparently federalized less
criminal conduct than it had during the 1980s, created fewer
new civil causes of action than Congress had during the prior
two decades,33 and restricted some civil jurisdiction.34
Lawmakers did, however, pass a significant number of less
important criminal statutes and general crime legislation
between 1990 and 2000,35 while adopting several
comprehensive civil enactments .36
31. Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt, whom Justice Byron White joined, urged retention
of this jurisdiction only when parties "show a concrete need for a fedeial forum ...
because of (1) the existence of local influence that threatens prejudice to an out-of-state
litigant, or (2) the complex nature of interstate litigatio;n." See COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 77-88. For evaluations of analogous ideas, see JUDIOAL
CONFERENCE OF 1HE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR 1HE FEDERAL COURTS 134 (1995)
[hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; McKENNA, supra note 4, at141-53.
32 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series: Administering Justice
in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1135 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207
(1972); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified in scattered sections of 7 & 16 U.S.C. (1994)); (Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §1501 (1994)); Major Fraud Act, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 102
Stat 4631 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 41 U.S.C. (1994)).
34. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-32, 110 Stat 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II
1996)); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-66
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (1994)); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1996)). See generally Carl Tobias, Common
Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699, 702-17 (1995) (describing
proposed procedural reforms in civil justice).
35. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 102-322, 108 Stat 796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of the United States
Code).
36. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
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Additional measures to restrict appeals appear equally
infeasible or ineffective. For instance, the Commission decided
not to recommend that Congress make appellate jurisdiction
discretionary in all cases. Discretionary review contravenes the
accepted notion that a losing litigant should have one
opportunity to convince an appeals court that the trial judge
committed prejudicial error. The Commission did expressly
admit that the procedural limitations analyzed in Anastasojf
and Hart have blurred the difference between mandatory and
discretionary review.37 Another possibility would be to expand
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, but the improvement would likely be
negligible because the entire appellate system would be
addressing the same number of appeals.38
B.

Treating Appeals Directly

One additional approach would be the prompt, economical,
and equitable judicial treatment of those cases that litigants do
pursue. A clear, if rather controversial, solution would be to
increase staff support or authorize additional circuit
judgeships. For example, the steady growth in appellate
caseloads prompted the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, to request
that Congress approve new members for numerous appeals
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§12101-213 (1994)). Congress
will probably not cabin jurisdiction because many lawmakers capitalize on the
basically cost-free political advantages realized by federalizing new fields of
criminal activity and by recognizing more civil causes of action. The Supreme
Court might narrow jurisdiction with the abstention or justiciability doctrines, but
this could prevent resolution on the merits and would minimally decrease
appeals' quantity, even were the approach less troubling. See Paul D. Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 544 (1969); Martha Dragich, Once a Century:
Time for a Structural Overhaul ofthe Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 16-17.
37. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 70-72. For analyses of the relevant
history, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 234-38; Dragich, supra note 36, at 52-54; Tobias,
supra note 3, at 238-39.
38. The Commission assessed major reasons to centralize review of social
security and tax cases in the Federal Circuit, but designated no new types of
appeals Congress might usefully assign it. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 72-74. Because the Federal Circuit may lack special expertise in these two areas,
this approach might not facilitate efficiency, offer systemic economies, or be fairer
to litigants. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comments to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/ comments/DOJ.html [hereinafter Comments];
see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 222-27 (analyzing other ways to reduce appeals);
Tobias, supra note 3, at 234-35 (analyzing even more ways to reduce appeals).
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courts during the 1990s.39
Although enlarging the number of administrative employees
and their duties or creating more appellate court judgeships
might expedite case review, both alternatives could have
detrimental effects. Increasing extra-judicial support or staff
obligations might create additional bureaucratic obstacles and
correspondingly reduce circuit judges' visibility and
accountability.40 The possibility of expanding the relatively
large federal judiciary has contributed to the dispute over
splitting the Ninth Circuit. Enlarging the bench might also
reduce efficiency and magnify some complications identified
by the Commission, such as deficient communications. Finally,
expansion could engender staunch opposition from many
judges, even if the Senate and the President could guarantee
prompt confirmations for the newly established positions.41
A less problematic, more feasible approach would be to fill
the current appeals and district court judicial vacancies. At
various junctures during the 1990s, several circuits, (most
prominently the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth),
functioned without a number of the active appeals court judges
authorized by Congress.42 This situation required a few
39. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Overview, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2001, at 1; see
also S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000). But see CHARLFS E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATE
JUDICTARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHf & nm COURTS,
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON nm APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN nm
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, Executive Summary {1999).
40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRrsIS AND REFORM 2628 {1985); CHRISTOPHER E. SMTIH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND
COURT ADMINISTRATION 95-124 (1995); see also supra note 5 and accompanying
text For analyses of these increases and their disadvantages, see McKENNA, supra
note 4, at 49-54; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 23-25.
41. See Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Mrss. COL. L.
REY. 319 (1994); Dragich, supra note 36, at 45-49; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial
Selection in a Time ofDivided Government, 47 EMORY L. J. 527 (1998). New positions
may afford few long-term benefits and only be a stopgap that worsens some
problems, namely inadequate intracircuit uniformity and collegiality, which can
attend the administration of large courts and implicate circuit-splitting. See, e.g.,
BAKER, supra note 3, at 202; Tobias, supra note 3, at 235; Carl Tobias, The
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1388-89 (1995); see also
WILLIAM P. MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CAsELOADS 107 (1984) (describing
how more judges may not yield permanent improvement); S. 346, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prescribing a Ninth Circuit split).
42 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 30; Carl Tobias, The Judicial
Vacancy Conundrum in the Ninth Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REY. 1283 (1997); Shirley M.
Hufstedler, Comments fo the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals (Oct 23, 1998); Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n,
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
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appellate courts, such as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, to cancel
oral arguments, thereby imposing unwarranted cost and delay,
and to rely substantially on judges apart from their own active
members when assembling three-judge panels.43 In fact,
approximately one-third of the panels terminating cases after
oral argument nationwide during the 1997 fiscal year included
at least one participant who was not an active judge of the
court, with the Eleventh Circuit employing visitors at a rate
nearly double the national average. 44 Too great dependence on
visiting judges can have negative effects, including more
expensive or slower dispute resolution. One possible solution
would be to ensure that courts have available every authorized
active circuit judge to hear cases. For example, if the Ninth
Circuit could function with all twenty-eight active members, it
might be able to render decisions more promptly. To fill open
appeals court judgeships, the President should carefully
consult senators before formally nominating candidates, and
senators should cooperate closely with the President in
confirming judges for openings.45 Even if every appeals court
were working with its total judicial contingent, however, the
appellate judiciary might lack enough resources to resolve
mounting caseloads as expeditiously, inexpensively, and
equitably as is desirable.
An additional direct, but controversial, way of addressing
docket growth would be to further restrict the procedural
options of those filing appeals. For instance, appellate courts
could further decrease the declining percentage of cases
accorded a comprehensive treatment, including oral arguments
and published opinions. This approach would help resolve
appeals quickly and cheaply, although it may threaten fairness,
undermine visibility and accountability, and diminish public
Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998).
43. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit,
19 REV. LmG. 233 (2000); Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26,
1997, at37.
44. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 7, at 108, Table 6a. For assessments of
appeals courts' reliance on visiting judges, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 198-201.
45. White House and Senate political party control are now reversed; however,
President Bush has realized little more success than President Clinton in
appointing judges. There are currently more than 90 vacancies and over 50
pending nominations. Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary (April 19, 2002), at http://
www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm; see also Sheldon Goldman &
Elliot Slotnick, Introduction: Clinton's Judicial Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 227 (2001).
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acceptance of appellate determinations.46
Other measures that directly respond to increasing dockets
seem impractical or ineffective, principally because of the
possible detrimental side effects. For example, certain
alternatives to dispute resolution, such as arbitration,47 and
panels of two rather than three circuit judges,48 would foster
the prompt, economical resolution of more appeals. Yet
reducing the number of judges that review a case can
jeopardize equitable decisionmaking and erode the visibility
and accountability of the appellate court bench.49 Judges might
also capitalize on case management techniques such as those
used by the Ninth Circuit, which applies special screening
panels to resolve appeals with truncated processes and
employs greater "batching" of cases that involve analogous
issues or similar legislation, thereby expediting disposition.50
Although these types of actions could yield efficiencies, the
remaining advantages that courts can derive from procedural
modifications nevertheless appear relatively minute.
In short, the legislative and judicial branches should
carefully scrutinize and consider applying approaches to
reduce the number of appeals. Failing that, they should directly
treat in a prompt, inexpensive, and fair manner those cases
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN
TiiE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION (1990). For assessments of
alternatives to dispute resolution, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 136-47; Tobias, supra
note 3, at 230.
48. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 31, at 131-32; MCl<ENNA, supra note 4, at
127-33. For analyses of these panels, see COMMI5.SION REPoRT, supra note 3, at 62-66;
Dragich, supra note 36, at 58-62
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Seven chief judges criticized the
Commission idea for District Court Appellate Panels, saying that it rested on the
"flawed premise that cases are easily divisible into two categories," error
correction and law declaration, and would add another level of review for most
cases, which would be "expensive to litigants and unacceptable." The idea would
burden the judiciary, collld require more "district judgeships for appellate
furposes, which does not seem to be good public policy; and would provoke
'virtually monolithic opposition by district judges." Harry Edwards et al.,
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/
comments/Becker.htm. Accord Comments, supra note 38.
50. See NIN1H CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 17 (Mar. 2000);
Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The Innovative Work of
the Evaluation Committee (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
See generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth
Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (2000) (describing techniques used to facilitate the
disposition of cases in the Ninth Circuit).
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actually brought. Such measures, however, may have limited
feasibility or efficacy. Further, appellate courts seem to have
exhausted the benefits they can extract from such procedural
reforms as refined screening and related management
techniques. Because the problem of docket growth may now
resist definitive resolution and could even be intractable, there
may be little value in applying these ideas. Instead, the federal
judiciary might need to forge a consensus on the best means of
addressing caseload expansion. For example, judges could
undertake a finely-calibrated assessment of current and
projected docket magnitude as well as the resources available
to combat growing appeals while evaluating how effectively
courts deliver appellate justice. If resources for deciding cases
are inadequate to provide sufficient justice, the solution may be
to increase the number of judgeships or extra-judicial
personnel. Members of the bench must first reach greater
accord, however, about the best remedies to combat increasing
appeals with relatively static resources. Until then, the problem
could well remain unresolved and perhaps worsen.
IV. CONCLUSION

A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit recently found
unconstitutional a local appellate rule stating that
"unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally
should not cite them." Despite the validity of the constitutional
holding in Anastasoff, the decision elucidates and accentuates
the critical issue of rising caseloads in the face of scarce
resources to decide them. Judge Arnold astutely observes that
appellate courts will be in serious difficulty if this situation
prevents judges from ascribing all appeals precedential effect.
After Judge Arnold provides a compelling critique of this
notion, he recommends devoting adequate resources to
caseload resolution and, should this prove infeasible,
admonishes that his colleagues commit sufficient time to
address each appeal competently, even if backlogs accumulate.
The federal legislative and judicial branches must heed
Anastasoff's warning by redoubling their efforts to resolve the
complications presented by docket increases and limited
resources, because these problems will grow and promise to
continue eroding appellate justice.

